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TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction
In December 1989, the violent end of Ceausescu's authoritarian regime in Romania and the subsequent collapse of the Warsaw Pact opened the road for Romania to pursue NATO integration. Fourteen years later, Romania became a NATO member. Today, Romania is a security contributor and an emergent democracy. Moreover, the USA and Romania derive the dividends of a beneficial strategic partnership while the process of European integration advances. However, Romania's current security status has been achieved through a challenging process. Considering itself a European nation, Romania has always struggled to become a part of the so called West. This paper describes the path Romania took to achieve the goal of NATO membership. There are three dimensions which proved relevant to describing Romania's road toward NATO membership: NATO's reform process and posture toward enlargement after 1989; Romania's historical relationship with the West after1965; and Romania's military reform process after the fall of Ceausescu's communist regime.
First, NATO's own approach toward enlargement influenced decisively the foreign policy of every candidate for membership. Before the fall of European communism, NATO was largely a robust military instrument to counter the Soviet expansion toward the West.
Consequently, NATO enlargement occurred whenever opportunities arose to counter the communist threat. After the early 1990's, the European security environment changed drastically and NATO faced different challenges in accepting new members. Moreover, NATO remained the only security alliance that could guarantee stability in the former communist countries. Some experts considered NATO's new security role in Europe the answer to the question addressing NATO's relevancy after the Cold War. NATO had to reform itself while developing policies for intervention in response to security threats in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the enlargement process after the 1990's proved infeasible without adequate organizational changes within NATO. Also, NATO had to develop policy instruments to strengthen cooperation with the to counter-terrorism and the new emergent threats. In short, NATO's enlargement process after 1990 helped maintain stability in the former Eastern European countries and ensured the security environment the candidates needed to implement democratic reforms.
Next, Romania's relationship with the West after the mid 1960's influenced its post-Cold
War commitment to NATO membership. Also, the Romanian governments' ability after the fall of Ceausescu's regime to implement NATO's requirements for membership was critical.
Historically, Romania sought to balance its foreign policy objectives between 1965 and 1989.
Ceausescu's regime, while still authoritarian and despotic, moved toward economic cooperation with the West after 1965. Also, Romania focused on improving its relationship with the U.S.
However, Romania's security strategy before 1989 relied on its membership in the Warsaw Pact.
This duality produced confusion in the West over Romania's commitment to democratic changes.
The West remained skeptical about Ceausescu's regime and Romania faced isolation. The Romanian Revolution in 1989 offered Romania the opportunity to escape the Soviet influence and to open the road for cooperation with the West. After 1989, the dominant constant in Romania's security strategy was NATO integration 1 . High Romanian public support for NATO membership and the stable political consensus confirmed that Romania was committed to becoming a NATO member. The Romanian government's struggle was to generate the proper resources to support the reforms needed for NATO membership. Additionally, the Romanian governments after 1989 had to prove to NATO that Romania would be a security contributor.
Romania had to solve any regional security issues with its neighbors and to manage internal social and ethnic problems. Also. Romania benefited from its strategic position when NATO considered Romania's relevancy for membership. Romania's proximity to the emergent threats the Middle East and to the economic opportunities in the Caucasus ultimately proved to be strong reasons when NATO considered Romania's candidacy. In summary, there were three dimensions to Romania's evolution toward its current security status. First was the transformation of NATO's security and political goals to move NATO beyond a military alliance to counter the Soviet Union. Next, was the transformation of Romania to prove its worthiness for membership. Last were the difficult military reforms needed to provide relevant military capabilities at a cost Romania could afford. However, NATO's enlargement approach after 1990 was the most decisive factor in Romania's NATO membership process. The NATO cooperation and enlargement process after 1990 shaped the Eastern European security environment. On the other hand, each aspirant's efforts focused on rapid integration in the Western security and economic organizations. Ensuring robust democratic development was the fundamental concern of the new governments in Eastern Europe. Following more than four decades of painful communism, Romania's current status relies on its critical security relationship with NATO. However, Romania achieved this position through a rather challenging process.
NATO's enlargement -building new security nexuses

Romania's international posture before and after 1989
At 27 Consequently, in Romania it was difficult to identify the real ideologues and the West maintained the perception of massive communist presence in the political parties.
The analysis in the West remained subjective as long as there was no independent database to evaluate the political development. • Retired the military personnel who completed studies in Soviet Union and sought Western assistance for educating a new wave of professionals. Romanian officers and noncommissioned officers started to attend education in the U.S.A., Great Britain, Italy, Germany and Canada.
The Path for Reform 1993-1995
• Reintroduced religious services within the military system and human rights considerations.
In 1994, NATO instituted the Partnership for Peace to improve cooperation and to offer opportunities for non-member countries to contribute to security and stability initiatives. integration. 30 The ratio remained almost the same even when the cost of integration and of implementing the initial military reform objectives reached $4 billion. The Romanian commitment was so costly that skeptics within NATO doubted that the Romanian public understood the economic implications of the integration costs. The defense budget allocation remained at 2 percent of GDP until after 1996, an adequate allocation for a NATO member state.
However, Romania lost important financial resources through its participation in the 1991 NATO's overall attitude toward Romania considered also the regional security situation and Romania's strategies to address regional and internal risks. Romania had to prove it could develope the policies, plans and capabilities to address any regional ethnic, social or territorial disputes. Another issue used to evaluate Romania's capability to address ethnic issues and directly promote regional stability was the status of the Roma minority. Roma (gypsies) represent the second largest ethnic group in Romania with a census population of 400,000, although the unofficial total is close to one million. The majority of the Romanian population regard the Roma as the source of illegal and black market activities. Following some isolated examples of local violence against Roma, Romania approached the issue through an European institutional framework. 52 Romania requested EU's assistance in developing a legal framework to address the Roma problem. Romania did so to prove it had adopted an European attitude toward solving ethnic minority problems. With external financial support Romania developed programs to improve the education and local status of this minority and prevented social-ethnic conflicts.
Strategic and strategy considerations
Lastly, Romania had to complement its regional cooperation and internal stability efforts with a feasible and sustainable military reform. Romania acknowledged that a robust military reform would boost its credibility when NATO considered its readiness for membership. A new force structure appropriate for the security requirements and the status of NATO member.
The military reform
• Reorganization of the Ministry of Defense to focus decision making on integration and restructuring goals.
• Improved resource allocation and management through the PPBES.
•
Institution of a reliable personnel management system to address better the care needed by soldiers separated from service and resources needed for training and modernization.
• Reassessment of the major acquisition programs to eliminate unneeded systems and to provide relevant capabilities for Romanian forces in partnership with NATO. Within MAP, Romania based its PNA on the following core principles:
• Continuity (respect the preceding commitments and continue to consolidate the accomplishments from one cycle to another); • Credibility (select the objectives and ensure the political commitment for allocating adequate resources for implementing these); • Predictability (develop the capability for realistic planning and respect the plan for implementing each objective). 
The second MAP domain's actors and process
Coordinating the second MAP chapter, the Romanian MoD based its policies and plans on the following principles:
• Continue irreversibly the military reform and prevent latency of the overall process; • Select priorities based on the required NATO interoperability objectives; • Improve the defense planning system; • Ensure correlation while implementing PNA objectives and NATO PGs.
However, Romania faced challenges in implementing the MAP during its early stages.
NATO representatives provided the needed expertise related to defense and military issues during NATO-Romania MAP sessions. The process evaluated the progress of the military reform and provided a prospectus for Romania's military forces especially those offered for NATO missions.
On the other hand, the bilateral forum also helped identify deficiencies in Romania's plans and policies. After 2000, the main gaps were: 62 Ibid., 174
•
The military reform faced slow progress and stagnation due to a precarious management of resources; • Despite the declared objectives of restructuring and force reduction, over 60% of the defense budget remained allocated to personnel costs and redundant acquisition programs with insufficient funds dedicated for training; • Romanian MoD had no priorities for selecting only the PfP activities related to the military reform; in fact, in most NATO/PfP activities before 2000, Romania focused more on quantity than quality; • Romania implemented too few PNA objectives in the first MAP cycle and this influenced negatively the overall interoperability with NATO forces. 
The 3d and 4th MAP cycles 2001-2003
The MAP formula continued to be the key instrument for reform and it remained a fundamental planning tool in Romania's reform and restructuring process. The following sections focus on the achievements of the 3d cycle and set out the objectives for the 4th cycle. The Armed Forces concentrated on increasing Romania's level of interoperability to effectively participate alongside NATO forces in peace support operations, and in the international campaign against terrorism.
The 3d MAP cycle was particularly important for establishing a qualitative approach focused on capabilities. During the 3d MAP cycle, Romania continued to pursue military reform and the restructuring of its Armed Forces. A holistic review of the armed forces was launched, taking into account the new strategic environment and the fight against terrorism. The goal was to build a flexible structure that meets national defense and NATO requirements using smaller, better-trained, better-equipped and more mobile forces. This review envisaged a gradual reduction in force size to reach by 2007 a final structure of 75,000 military personnel and 15,000 civilians.
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The most significant objectives included the following:
• Disestablish more than 100 units, restructure other 300 and make operational two brigades (to be continued during the 4th MAP cycle), the Main Operational Air Centre, one air base and one ship squadron.
• Maintain and increase the interoperability level of the forces nominated for NATO.
• Increase participation with more than 100% in KFOR and SFOR, and participate in ISAF and Enduring Freedom Operation providing more than 450 troops.
• Improve the officers/NCOs ratio from 1/1.14 to 1/1.23 by further reducing the number of senior officers and training NCOs.
• Improve the air space management by continuing the implementation of the Air Surveillance Operational Centre (ASOC).
• Acquire modern NATO compatible communication radios for units earmarked for NATO-led operations, and continue the implementation of the Romanian Armed Forces Communication System (STAR). 
Conclusion
Romania's future security status will still depend on the three relevant dimensions:
NATO's enlargement approach, Romania's future relations with the West, especially with the U.S., and Romania's future military transformation.
First, NATO's future enlargement will continue to be decisive for Romania's foreign policy decisions. However, some experts have argued that future NATO enlargement to include Ukraine, Croatia and Albania would make NATO's decision making process more difficult. The premise is that as the number of NATO members increases the more difficult building a consensus will become. Furthermore, NATO will face a variety of different security arrangements and requirements owing to each member's security interests. President Basescu has declared that Romania will seek a stronger security role in the Black Sea basin and will focus its foreign policy primarily on a "Washington-London-Bucharest axis." At the same time, Eastern
European NATO members provide better proximity to the possible conflict areas in Asia and the Middle East. The U.S. has already decided to reposition its forces from Central Europe toward Eastern Europe to become more efficient in the fight against terrorism. Additionally, NATO has recognized that Eastern European members have recorded better progress in developing new deployment capabilities than some of the Western Europe NATO members. On the other hand, 68 Ibid.
Eastern European members should maintain positive economic growth to be able to allocate adequate defense resources.
Next, Romania's relationship with the West will be influenced by two factors: Romania's integration in the European Union and Romania's future enhancement of the strategic partnership with the U.S. Greater integration in the European Union will improve economic cooperation with the West and will attract foreign investments needed to develop the Romanian economy. That would ensure constant economic growth and the resources required to support Romania's security strategy. Similarly, improvements in a U.S.-Romanian strategic partnership would enhance the pro-U.S. group within NATO and foster Romanian support for American initiatives. Also, an enhanced bilateral strategic partnership could exploit Romania's offer to host U.S. troops on its territory. This presence would allow Romania to improve its training standards and combat readiness of its deployable units. Second, the Romanian Navy will have to fully integrate its frigates to be able to contribute to the security of the Black Sea Basin. Consequently, the challenges Romania faced during the five MAP's, namely, providing the resources to achieve the required military capabilities related to Romania's security goals will remain. Fortunately, Romania's dedicated commitment to achieving those goals during the past decade is not likely to wane.
